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Abstract: Using matched employer-employee data collected in seven African countries, we 
present comparative evidence on the magnitude of the gender wage gap in African 
manufacturing sectors. Using OLS regressions, differences in male and female earnings are 
found both in Mauritius and Morocco, while the gender wage gap turns out to be insignificant 
in Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and Uganda. Results from quantile regressions 
indicate that the wage gap remains not constant across the wage distribution. Finally, we 
study the role of firm characteristics and job segregation across firms as potential factors 
explaining the gender wage gaps.  
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2 1. Introduction 
 Many empirical studies have found that women and men face unequal treatment in the 
workplace, especially in terms of wages. Almost all developed countries’ labor markets are 
characterized by a significant gender wage gap, whose explanations may be related to 
differences in the level of human capital between male and female employees or to 
discrimination from employers against the female workforce among other factors (see Blau 
and Kahn, 2000). More recently, several studies using data from Sweden, Spain and France 
have shown that the gender wage gap was unlikely to remain constant throughout the wage 
distribution (Albrecht et al., 2003; de la Rica et al., 2008; Jellal et al., 2008).  
 Contrary to the case of developed countries, less is known about gender wage 
differences in developing countries, especially with respect to the possible varying magnitude 
of the gender gap across the wage distribution. Gender-specific analyses using African data 
remain scarce, as it can be inferred from the meta-analysis of Weichselbaumer and Winter-
Ebmer (2005). Results from previous studies on African countries indicate however that there 
is a wide consensus on the presence of substantial wage inequalities between men and 
women, both among salaried and self-employed workers
1
. This is somewhat worrying as 
reducing gender inequality is usually recommended as an efficient tool in the fight against 
poverty in poor countries. Furthermore, the decrease in gender inequalities is part of the third 
Millennium Development Goals.  
Our purpose in this contribution is to add new comparative evidence on the magnitude 
of the gender wage gap in the African manufacturing sectors. In a context where wages 
remain usually low, it may be that employers tend to limit the use of discrimination against 
women. To investigate more closely the potential differences in the gender wage gap, we 
propose a comparative analysis of seven African countries using the recent Investment 
Climate Assessment (ICA hereafter) surveys, carried out in the framework of the World Bank 
RPED program
2
. These surveys have the particularity to gather information both on the 
                                                
1 Studies on the gender wage gap in Africa include Glewwe (1990) for Ghana, Cohen and House (1993) for 
Sudan, Milne and Neitzert (1994) and Agesa (1999) for Kenya, Glick and Sahn (1997) for Guinea, Lachaud 
(1997) for Burkina and Cameroun, Armitage and Sabot (1991) for Kenya and Tanzania, Appleton et al. (1999) 
for Uganda, Côte d'Ivoire and Ethiopia, Isemonger and Roberts (1999) for South Africa, Siphambe and 
Thokweng-Bakwena (2001) for Botswana, Kabubo-Mariara (2003) for Kenya, Temesgen (2006) for Ethiopia, 
Nordman et al. (2009) for seven West African capitals using household data, Kolev and Suarez Robles (2009) 
for Ethiopia, Nordman et al. (2009) and Nordman and Roubaud (2009) for Madagascar, Nordman and Wolff 
(2009a) for Morocco and Nordman and Wolff (2009b) for a comparison between the formal sectors of 
Madagascar and Mauritius. 
2 The Africa Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) is an ongoing research project with the 
overall purpose of generating business knowledge and policy advice useful to private sector manufacturing 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. For further details, see www.worldbank.org/rped.  
3characteristics of manufacturing firms and on a sample of their workers, meaning that they 
provide matched employer-employee data.  
To study gender inequalities in pay, researchers may either rely on household data 
with information on individual earnings or on such matched employer-employee data. In the 
former case, it is theoretically possible to account for selectivity issue since many women do 
not take part in the labor market and some of them work in informal sector jobs. However, 
correction of selectivity issue is often problematic as it raises methodological controversies 
regarding the choice of the appropriate instruments needed to identify selection properly
3
. In 
addition, in such household surveys, there is usually no detailed description of the 
respondent’s job and of her workplace. This is a crucial feature when measuring experience 
for instance. While numerous studies rely on potential experience, this covariate is likely to be 
affected by measurement errors (Heywood, 1988; Nordman and Roubaud, 2009). The use of 
actual experience when it is available in the data, as is the case in this chapter, seems much 
more appropriate when studying gender wage differences. 
Clearly, heterogeneity at the firm level is likely to bias the estimates of the gender 
wage gap if firms’ characteristics influence wages of men and women differently
4
. The use of 
matched employer-employee data allows estimating fixed effects models which control for 
both observed and unobserved characteristics of the workplace. Although employer-employee 
data are unrepresentative of the population of interest at the country level, the matched data 
may offer more opportunities than household data to analyze gender differences in pay if we 
consider that the firms’ characteristics matter in the wage formation process
5
.  
Recent findings from Morocco indicate that it matters to account for firm fixed effects 
in wage regression when explaining gender differences in pay (Nordman and Wolff, 2009a). 
In African manufacturing, Fafchamps et al. (2006) note that the gender wage gap may arise as 
a result of gender-specific sorting of workers across firms that pay different wages. This last 
explanation relates to the presence of gender segregation across firms. If there are high paying 
firms that hire more men than women and if there are at the same time low paying firms 
hiring more women than men, then firms’ characteristics will deeply influence the gender 
differences in wages. Controlling for firm heterogeneity should therefore reduce the 
                                                
3 Some studies using household data even end up relying essentially on estimates without selectivity correction to 
avoid this difficulty (Appleton et al., 1999; Nordman and Roubaud, 2009; Nordman et al., 2009). 
4 For instance, there may be differences in the wage levels offered to female workers respectively by female and 
male employers. Neglecting the sex of the managers will thus affect the various returns to individual 
characteristics when estimating wage regressions. 
5 There is thus a trade-off between accounting for selectivity in labor market entry with the use of household data 
and controlling for jobs and firms’ heterogeneity with matched worker-firm data. In the absence of definite 
theoretical argument, this remains an unsettled question. 
4magnitude of the gender wage gap. In the same vein, Hellerstein et al. (2002) study whether 
competitive market forces act to reduce discrimination. They show that among plants with 
high levels of product market power, those that employ relatively more women are more 
profitable, while the relationship is not significant for plants with low levels of market power. 
This result is consistent with sex discrimination in wages in markets where plants have 
product market power. 
This discussion suggests that employer-employee data are ideally needed to study the 
gender pay gap, since such matched data allows purging the effect of firm heterogeneity on 
wage differentials (Meng, 2004; Meng and Meurs, 2004). As we have matched data from 
manufacturing firms in African countries, we are able in our empirical work to control for 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level by estimating fixed effect wage 
models. In so doing, we show how controls of the firm wage policies in wage equations affect 
the estimated magnitude of the gender wage gap
6
. Furthermore, using information at the firm 
level (for instance the proportion of female employees in each enterprise), we explicitly 
account for the possibility of gender segregation across firms which may explain the varying 
magnitude of the gender gap across countries. 
The seven African countries that we select for our econometric analysis, i.e. Benin, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal and Uganda, are particularly interesting in 
a comparative perspective. For instance, while Mauritius is perhaps the most interesting 
economic development success story of the decade of the 1980s
7
, Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Senegal and Uganda, by contrast, remain ones of the poorest countries in the world. 
According to the 2007-2008 Human Development Index (HDI) ranking of the UNDP, 
Mauritius stands at the 65
th
 position while Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and Uganda, 
appear far in the ranking, respectively at the 163
rd
, 148
th
, 143
rd
, 156
th
, and 154
th
 place (out of 
177 countries). In this respect, Morocco appears in an intermediate position, at the 126
th
 place. 
A comparative case study of these countries is worthwhile to assess whether gender 
inequalities in pay are somehow linked to the level of economic development. The fact that 
these countries have distinct economic performances and labor market features may be 
helpful in the understanding of the roots of gender wage differences. In our empirical 
analysis, we first estimate the gender wage gap using OLS earnings regressions and 
                                                
6 Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we are unable to disentangle the determinants of the within-firm wage 
gap across countries as in Nordman and Wolff (2009a) in Morocco. For a within-firm analysis, one would need 
larger datasets including a large number of firms with interviews of at least two male and two female employees. 
7 Its GDP per capita ($13,240 in 2005 in PPP) places the Mauritius Island in the category of newly 
industrialized country. 
5decompose the gender gap in two components, one due to differences in individual labor 
market characteristics and one due to differences in the returns to these characteristics. Then, 
using quantile regressions, we wonder whether the gender gap remains constant across the 
wage distribution. Finally, we focus more closely on the role of firm characteristics and job 
segregation across firms as potential factors explaining the gender wage gap. Do firms’ 
characteristics matter when explaining wage differences between male and female employees 
in the African manufacturing sectors?  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the ICA 
surveys and present descriptive statistics on workers, firms and wages. Our different 
econometric results based on OLS and quantile regressions, fixed effect models, and 
decomposition techniques are presented in Section 3. Finally, executive summary and 
concluding comments are in Section 4. 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
 2.1. The Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) surveys 
 The matched employer-employee data for Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Senegal and Uganda stem from the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) surveys conducted 
by the World Bank from to 2003 to 2005 in the framework of the African RPED program. 
The data for Morocco come from the Firm Analysis and Competitiveness Survey (FACS) 
conducted in 2000 by the World Bank and the Moroccan Ministry of Trade and Industry
8
. 
 These surveys are based on the notion that the workplace is the micro-data unit where 
labor supply and labor demand meet. In that spirit, the ICAs and FACS collect data both on 
the firm characteristics and on a sample of employees in each workplace. The questionnaires 
addressed to both employers and employees are specifically adapted for each country, but 
they enable cross-country comparisons as they are made of very similar questions.  
 In these countries, the firms have been randomly selected among the population of 
formal establishments using a stratification based on sector, size and localization. Hence, they 
are not mainly located in capital cities, but they are representative of the various regions of 
each country. In each firm, up to ten employees have been randomly sampled following the 
idea advocated by Mairesse and Greenan (1999). Some sampling frames at the firm level 
contained constraints on the size of the firms to be investigated, for instance no firm with less 
                                                
8 After deleting observations with missing values, the sizes of the worker samples are respectively 1574 for 
Benin, 1876 for Kenya, 1734 for Madagascar, 1363 for Mauritius, 7806 for Morocco, 1349 for Senegal and 
1306 for Uganda. 
6than ten employees in Madagascar, Morocco and Kenya, while some did not (Benin, 
Mauritius, Senegal and Uganda)
9
. Across countries, these firms belong to more or less ten 
manufacturing sectors
10
 that we can regroup into broadly eight activities: (1) agro industry, 
(2) chemicals and related products, (3) materials for construction, (4) furniture, (5) metallic 
products, (6) Industry of paper, paper products and plastics products, (7) Textiles and leather, 
and (8) Wood.  
 2.2. Description of the samples 
 The questionnaires of the surveys allow us to construct identical human capital 
indicators for the workers in the selected countries. For each respondent, we compute the 
number of years of completed schooling, the number of years of actual experience off the 
current firm and the number of years of tenure in the incumbent firm. These different 
covariates, which provide good controls for the potential productivity advantage in the labor 
markets, will then be introduced into the wage regressions. We also make use of two 
demographic variables, i.e. a dummy for gender and a dummy indicating whether the 
individual is married or not. 
As shown in Figure 1, there are large differences in the sex composition of the various 
samples. The female proportions in each sample are respectively 14.5%, 19%, 37%, 44%, 
40%, 17.5% and 19% respectively for Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Senegal and Uganda. Then, for Benin, Senegal, Kenya and Uganda, a first point worth 
mentioning is the much lower proportion of female employees, which indicates that we are 
presumably in the presence of particular women with unusual observed and unobserved 
human capital characteristics.  
The low proportion of women in some countries, which makes them a special case 
with particular human capital characteristics, is evidence of a selection effect on the labor 
market. Large inequalities in the access to the manufacturing sector are present, and they will 
certainly partly explain the cross-country differences observed in the magnitude of the wage 
gap. While our descriptive statistics suggest that access to manufacturing jobs is much more 
difficult for women living in Benin, Kenya, Senegal and Uganda, the use of matched 
employer-employee data offers no solution to account for this selection effect. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
                                                
9 For further details, see the RPED website: www.worldbank.org/rped. 
10 In the Moroccan FACS, there are seven sectors, i.e. electronics, textiles, garments, food, pharmaceuticals, 
leather and shoes products, and plastics. 
7According to Table 1, Kenyan, Malagasy and Ugandan workers are the most educated 
with an average of more than 11 years of completed schooling. The least educated workers 
are those of Benin and Morocco (respectively 9.5 and 8.6 years) while Mauritian and 
Senegalese workers are in intermediate positions (10 and 10.5 years of schooling 
respectively). Given Kenya’s, Madagascar’s and Uganda’s respective level of economic 
development compared to that of Mauritius and Morocco, this ranking could be surprising. 
Indeed, Sub-Saharan African countries are often believed to be less endowed in human capital 
compared to their North African neighbours, and notably relative to the newly industrialized 
Mauritius Island.  
Insert Table 1 here 
A first explanation is that an overwhelming proportion of poorly educated individuals 
actually work in the informal sectors of the countries under consideration here
11
. The latter are 
thus not in the sample design of the ICA surveys as the data we use stem from formal 
manufacturing firms and their workers. The formal private sectors in Benin, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Senegal and Uganda are highly selective and are thus reserved to the most 
educated workers. This is probably less true for Morocco and Mauritius where uneducated 
workers are also found in significant proportions in garment firms for instance
12
.  
Another interesting pattern of our samples, which may explain some differences in 
educational achievement across countries, is the sex distribution of education. While “only” 
two country samples exhibit a greater ratio of males’ years of education to that of females 
(respectively, 103% and 103.5% for Mauritius and Morocco), the other samples reveal an 
education gap in favor of women with ratios amounting to 94.6%, 94.8%, 94.2%, 78.4% and 
95.8% respectively for Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and Uganda. In this respect, the 
Senegalese case is the most revealing of the specificity of our samples, as female employees 
in this country benefit on average from almost three additional years of education than their 
male counterparts (12.82 versus 10.05)
13
.  
In all countries, male workers offset their potential disadvantage in terms of education 
with greater average number of years of experience in the labor market. This is reflected both 
                                                
11 For the Malagasy case, see Nordman et al. (2009). For the other countries, see DIAL (2007). 
12 Among other possible explanations, note that Madagascar has been one of the few low income countries to 
early recognize the importance of developing its educational system, and this country has made rapid progress 
in the development of public primary schools. Madagascar is also one of the few African countries to have 
achieved equal access to schooling between boys and girls, at least at low levels of the education system (World 
Bank, 2001). 
13 Using representative household surveys from seven West African capitals (including those of Benin and 
Senegal), Kuepie et al. (2009) show that the education gap is always largely in favor of men for paid-work 
participants.  
8by the sex ratios of males’ to females’ experience off the current job (respectively, 115%, 
213%, 155.4%, 137.7%, 147.6%, 163.2% and 161.4% for Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal and Uganda) and the sex ratios of tenure in the incumbent firm 
(respectively, 107%, 129.4%, 109.8%, 135.2%, 134.8%, 124.9% and 107.1%). On average, 
Mauritian workers are the most experienced (15.1 years of total actual experience), followed 
by Kenyans and Senegalese (about 12 years), Malagasies (11 years), Beninese (9.5 years) and 
finally Moroccans and Ugandans (8.9 years). 
 The proportions of workers on top of the occupational distribution (owners, managers, 
professionals) are roughly similar across Madagascar and Mauritius. In Benin, Morocco and 
Uganda, we observe greater proportions of workers in higher occupations while employees in 
Kenya and Senegal are in intermediate positions. In all cases studied (with the exception of 
Benin), men have better occupations than women, since they are more likely to be owners or 
managers. Women, on the contrary, compete well with men in the occupation of professionals 
(with university degree), which is conform to the previous finding of a greater education level 
for females in five samples out of seven. Interestingly, women are always found in greater 
proportions than men in the category of health, office and sale workers. Finally, unskilled 
production workers are prevalent in Madagascar (44%), followed by Senegal (32%), Morocco 
and Uganda (about 29%), Mauritius (26%), Kenya (22%) and Benin (20%). 
 When considering the firm samples, they comprise respective 194 enterprises for 
Benin, 248 for Kenya, 281 for Madagascar, 189 for Mauritius, 842 for Morocco, 249 for 
Senegal and 264 for Uganda. As shown in Table 2, the average numbers of total employees in 
our firm samples range from 39 (Benin) to 227 (Kenya) salaried workers. Regarding the firm 
size, the Beninese sample stands out compared to the other countries as it contains a 
significant proportion of small-sized enterprises, 30% of the firms having less than 11 
employees
14
. Similar average proportions of females in each firm are found (about 15%) for 
Benin, Kenya, Senegal and Uganda, while this share is more than twice higher for Moroccan, 
Malagasy and Mauritian firms. More firms are owned by a woman in Madagascar, 20% 
versus less than 10% in the other samples. This may affect the measure of the gender wage 
gap if female owners are less likely to offer lower wages to women than male ones.  
Insert Table 2 here
                                                
14 Note that even if many Beninese firms a small, they still belong to the formal sector as defined by international 
standards of informal activities since, to be included in the sampling frame, they are necessarily registered 
businesses. 
9 Ugandan firms display a higher share of managers and executives compared to the 
other firms (28% versus 17%, 16% and 15% respectively for Benin, Kenya and Senegal, and 
less than 10% for the three other firm samples). More generally, these proportions are low as 
compared to those observed in developed countries. The share of exporting firms is important 
in Mauritius (64%), Morocco (57%), Kenya (51%) and Senegal (50%), while it is 
comparatively low in Madagascar (30%), Benin (22%) and Uganda (18%). Mauritian firms 
are thus the most concerned with international competition on their product markets. Finally, 
there are some important differences in the sectoral distribution of firms across countries. The 
sector of agro-industry is prevalent in Kenya, Senegal and Uganda, while these are the textile 
sectors in Morocco and the sector of metallic products in Madagascar. By contrast, firms are 
less concentrated in the Beninese sample
15
.  
To summarize, the firm samples are different in many respects, with particularly 
distinct sizes, female proportions, vocation to export and sectors of activity. It thus matters to 
account for firm heterogeneity in the empirical analysis
16
. As we have matched employer-
employee data, we are able to control for both the characteristics of the workers and the firms. 
There are several ways to proceed. A first possibility would be to include in the regressions a 
large set of explanatory variables related to the firm in wage equations. The drawbacks of this 
method are that many firm characteristics are potentially collinear and that we do not account 
for the unobserved firm heterogeneity component. Another preferred strategy is thus to 
control for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level using fixed effect 
models, which is easy to implement with linear wage regression. This implementation is also 
possible in the context of quantile regressions.  
2.3. How large are gender wage differences? 
Let us first describe the wage distributions by gender in the different countries. Our 
measure of wages is based on hourly earnings (including other monetary advantages and 
premiums) and thus takes into account the potential heterogeneity in hours worked between 
men and women. As shown in Table 2, we observe higher mean wages for men in five 
countries out of seven. The two exceptions are Senegal and Uganda, where women’s average 
wages slightly exceed those of men.  
                                                
15 In Mauritius, the data set that we have does not allow us to have a clear identification of the different sectors. 
This is not an important drawback as we can control for the firms’ observed and unobserved characteristics 
thanks to the match employer-employee nature of the data. 
16 However, as we only have cross-sectional data, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the worker level is 
impossible. 
10
Insert Figure 2 here 
In Figure 2, we report histograms representing the magnitude of the gender wage gap 
respectively at the mean of the sample and at the 10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles of 
the wage distribution (respectively denoted by D1, Q1, Q2, Q3, D9). In all countries, the 
median wage (50
th
 percentile) is much lower than the mean wage. While the gap is important 
in Mauritius all along the wage distribution (the difference in log wages between men and 
women reaches about 50 percentage points of log), the gender gaps are insignificant at the 
mean point of the sample in the cases of Benin, Madagascar and Uganda. In Kenya, the gap 
amounts to about 11% at the mean (meaning that women earn on average 11% less than men), 
while this gap reaches 26% in Morocco and is highly significant. In the case of Senegal, as 
pointed out before, the gap is significantly in favor of women (at the 10 percent level) and 
reaches about 14% at the mean point of the sample. 
Unfortunately, the data show that calculations at the sample means hide significant 
differences in the magnitude of the gaps along the wage distribution. This is particularly true 
for the cases of Benin, Morocco and Uganda where the gaps vary significantly depending on 
the workers’ relative position in the wage distribution. In Benin for instance, the gap is 
significantly in favor of men in the lower part of the wage distribution while it is in favor of 
women in the upper part (from about the median of the distribution). By contrast, the reverse 
pattern holds true for Uganda where the gap changes sign and is detrimental to women in the 
upper part of the distribution. In Morocco, the large gap increases steadily all along the wage 
distribution, thereby revealing the potential existence of a glass ceiling effect against women 
on top of the distribution (Nordman and Wolff, 2009a). These preliminary statistics then 
justify turning to a distributional approach if one wants to have a proper view of the 
magnitude of the gender wage gaps in Africa.  
So, we obtain very different profiles among workers in the selected African 
manufacturing firms. Albeit preliminary, these findings suggest that the gender wage gaps 
observed in the formal sectors of these countries are quite diverse. To further understand the 
factors that influence the magnitude of this gender gap, we turn in the next section to an 
econometric analysis using OLS, fixed effects and quantile regressions. We also rely on 
decomposition methods to examine whether the gender wage gap stems from differences in 
endowments between men and women or from differences in the returns to these 
characteristics. Finally, we assess the role of job segregation across firms in the magnitude of 
the gender wage gap.
11
3. Econometric results 
 3.1. Evidence on the mean gender wage gap 
 We begin our empirical analysis by assessing the magnitude of the gender wage gap in 
the seven African countries using OLS regressions with the log hourly wage as dependent 
variable (see the Appendix). For each country, the linear model is estimated on the pooled 
sample comprising both male and female employees. The different covariates introduced into 
the regressions are respectively marital status, the completed years of education, years of 
experience off the firm and years of tenure in the firm (with quadratic profile for the last three 
variables)
17
. We choose to use actual experience off the firm instead of the years of potential 
experience because the measurement of potential experience may lead to gender-specific 
measurement errors (errors being more likely for women)
18
. As women are more likely to be 
out of the labor market, a measure of potential experience is expected to systematically 
overstate the actual experience of women. Note that we do not include regional dummies in 
the various regressions. The geographical differences will implicitly be controlled for in the 
fixed effects regressions. 
 In what follows, we focus on the gender coefficient in the earnings equation (Table 3, 
columns 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A, 7A). A brief investigation suggests that we have to make a 
difference between two groups of countries. On the one hand, there is no significant 
difference in male and female earnings in Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and Uganda. 
On the other hand, earnings are statistically different between men and women both in 
Mauritius and in Morocco. On average, women earn 12.4% less than men in Morocco and 
35.3% in Mauritius. Several explanations, related to either employees’ or firms’ 
characteristics or to the functioning of the labor market, may be helpful to understand these 
differences. 
Insert Table 3 here 
 An interesting feature of our comparative data is the apparent correlation between the 
proportion of female employees within firms and the gender wage gap. In the first group of 
countries (no gap), the share of women in the manufacturing sectors is somewhat low. It 
amounts to 14.5% in Benin, 18.9% in Kenya, 17.6% in Senegal and 19.0% in Uganda. The 
                                                
17 For the purpose of comparability of the covariates, the marital status variable is approximated in the case of 
Morocco where, like in Kenya and Uganda, the marital status was not collected from the workers. Instead, we 
use the fact of having declared children where information on children is available. In Africa, it is reasonable to 
assume that all individuals who have declared children are (or have been) married because of the social norms 
in force.  
18 See the results of using potential versus actual experience in Nordman and Roubaud (2009) for the case of 
Madagascar. In the case of Morocco, the actual experience variable concerns experience accumulated in the 
preceding job only. 
12
situation of Madagascar is different since the proportion of women is much higher (37%), 
which is not far from the cases of Mauritius and Morocco (respectively 43.9% and 40%). So, 
the differences among the seven African countries are certainly due to some selection effects, 
i.e. the idea of different access of workers to jobs. As there are few women working in the 
formal manufacturing sectors in Benin, Kenya, Senegal, and Uganda, these women are likely 
to have unobserved characteristics positively correlated with their productivity. This is 
expected to strongly reduce differences in earnings between men and women. 
Another difference between the selected African countries may lie in the composition 
of occupations within firms, which are not controlled for in the first columns of each set of 
country-specific regressions. Nevertheless, a difficulty with occupations is that they may be 
endogenous if employers discriminate between male and female workers on the basis of the 
type of job they do (Albrecht et al., 2003). Despite of this shortcoming, we add in columns 
(1B), (2B), (3B), (4B), (5B), (6B) and (7B) a set of occupational dummies
19
. As shown in 
Table 3, this has little effect on the magnitude of the gender wage gap. Again, there is no 
significant difference in earnings between men and women in Benin, Kenya, Senegal and 
Uganda. The gender gap is now slightly higher in Mauritius (39.7% instead of 35.3%) and 
slightly lower in Morocco (8.6% instead of 12.4%), while it is now significant and 
approximately equal to 10% in Madagascar.  
As we only control for individual characteristics in the previous linear models, this 
means that heterogeneity at the firm level is not taken into account. This is undoubtedly likely 
to bias the gender estimated coefficient since some firms’ characteristics may influence wages 
of men and women in a different way. This would be for instance the case if the gender wage 
gap arises as a result of gender-specific sorting of workers across firms that pay different 
wages. We then turn to fixed effects models (see the Appendix). Implicitly, we assume that 
the firms’ heterogeneity components are correlated with the exogenous explanatory variables. 
This is very important in our context if we (plausibly) assume that there is a sorting of 
workers across firms.  In particular, employees (either male or female) with “good” 
unobservable characteristics are more likely to work in firms paying high wages
20
. 
 According to the fixed effect estimates (Table 3, columns 1C, 2C, 3C, 4C, 5C, 6C and 
7C), the gender wage gap is now only significant in Mauritius and Morocco. Curiously, there 
is a slight increase in the absolute value of the gender coefficient for Morocco (13.3% instead 
                                                
19 Specifically, we introduce nine occupational dummy variables related to occupations in six countries of our 
sample, while there are six occupations in the Moroccan data. 
20 We implement statistical tests to test the relevance of our econometric specification. For the seven African 
countries, we find that the fixed effects specification is the most appropriate one. 
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of 12.4%), while the gender coefficient is divided by two in Mauritius. This is consistent with 
the idea that part of the gender gap is due to firm sorting and that firms’ characteristics 
influence the earnings of men and women differently. Two further comments are in order. 
First, the gender gap remains insignificant in Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and 
Uganda. Secondly, additional controls for occupations in the fixed effects regression 
substantially reduce the gender gap in Morocco.  
  
 3.2. The relative importance of gender in wage determination 
Results from OLS regressions suggest that gender matters to understand differences in 
individual wages, at least in Mauritius and Morocco, and that firms effects are important. In 
what follows, we attempt to assess the relative impact of the different explanatory variables 
introduced in the linear wage regressions. For that purpose, we follow the regression-based 
decomposition approach proposed in Fields (2004). The idea is to decompose the explained 
portion of the regression into weights for each of the covariates and the methodology is 
described in the Appendix. 
 When considering the basic specification with no controls for occupations and firm 
heterogeneity (Table 4, rows 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A, 7A), we find that the gender variable 
has very little influence in Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and Uganda. In these 
countries, the gender dummy explains at most 0.5% (in Madagascar) of the overall wage 
differences. The weight of the gender coefficient is much more important in Morocco (5.6%) 
and it is even three times higher in Mauritius (18.6%). So, among the selected African 
country, the problem of gender inequality in earnings is really a concern in that Island. The 
contribution of the gender variable still amounts to 17.5% when occupations are taken into 
account and to 15.7% when both occupations and firm fixed effects are controlled for (rows 
4A, 4B, 4C). 
Insert Table 4 here 
 It is then interesting to have a look at the relative contribution of the other covariates. 
In all countries, wages are mainly explained by years of schooling. The contribution of the 
education variable is greater than 70% in Benin, Madagascar, Morocco and Uganda, and it 
exceeds 50% in the seven African countries. Years of experience and years of tenure come 
after, the contribution of seniority being substantially higher than that of experience (except in 
Kenya and in Uganda). We observe significant changes in the weights once occupations are 
taken into account (rows 1B, 2B, 3B, 4B, 5B, 6B, 7B). Occupations are really important in 
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Kenya, in Madagascar, in Morocco and in Uganda, where they explain about one-half of the 
total wage differences
21
.   
 A last finding concerns the inclusion of firm fixed effects (rows 1C, 2C, 3C, 4C, 5C, 
6C, 7C). The contribution of the firm heterogeneity is substantial, as it exceeds 20% in 
Madagascar and Morocco and even 30% in Benin and Uganda. Furthermore, controlling for 
the firm effects significantly reduces the contribution of the schooling variable. This may be 
due to the sorting of workers, the most productive workers being hired in firms offering 
higher wages. 
3.3. The gender wage gap along the conditional wage distribution 
According to the ICA surveys, the mean level of wage is significantly different for 
men and women both in Mauritius and Morocco. However, not observing a gender wage gap 
for the other countries using OLS regressions does not necessarily mean that there is no 
gender wage gap in the manufacturing firms. In the context of a developed country, Albrecht 
et al. (2003) have shown that the gender gap was unlikely to remain constant throughout the 
wage distribution. We thus turn to quantile regressions, further described in the Appendix, to 
investigate the magnitude of the gender wage gap along the wage distribution using the male-
female pooled samples (Koenker, 2005). 
 Let us first focus on the two countries where men and women receive different mean 
wages (Table 5). On the one hand, we note that the gender wage gap does not really vary 
across the wage distribution in Mauritius. The difference in earnings is for instance 35.9% at 
the 25
th
 percentile, 34.6% at the median and 38.1% at the 90
th
 percentile. So, there is no sharp 
increase in the gender gap when considering the upper part of the wage distribution of that 
country. On the other hand, the gender gap is almost three times higher at the 90
th
 percentile 
than at the 10
th
 percentile in Morocco (respectively 16.8% instead of 6.1%). 
Insert Table 5 here 
 The quantile estimates for the other countries show that the shape of the gender wage 
gap is really country-specific. In Benin, differences in earnings between men and women are 
now significant in the lower part of the wage distribution. Women receive much lower wages 
than men at the 10
th
 and 25
th
 percentiles, respectively 30.8% and 9.3%. The opposite pattern 
holds in Uganda. Women outearn men in the lower part of the wage distribution, with a 
                                                
21 In addition, including occupations strongly affects the relative contributions of the other covariates, in 
particular education. For instance, in Kenya, the weight associated with years of schooling is 65.2% without 
controls for occupations, but it amounts to 17.4% once occupations are in the list of regressors. 
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female wage premium exceeding 20%. However, women receive significantly lower wages at 
the 90
th
 percentiles. Finally, there is no clear variation across the distribution in Kenya, 
Madagascar and Senegal. Accounting for occupations also affects the magnitude of the gender 
gap, which is in particular significant at the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles in Madagascar when 
controlling for occupations in the quantile regressions
22
. 
  
 3.4. Quantile decomposition of differences in distributions 
 A very restrictive assumption in the previous regressions is the fact that the returns to 
individual characteristics have to be the same for men and women. Unfortunately, this 
hypothesis of equal returns is unlikely to hold if there are strong selection effects of female 
employees due to sorting for instance. It is straightforward to decompose the total difference 
in earnings between men and women into two components, one due to differences in labor 
market characteristics and one due to differences in the returns to these characteristics (see 
Appendix). For each country, we plot in Figure 3 the magnitude of the gender wage gap 
across the earnings distribution calculated from gender-specific regressions. We also indicate 
the relative contribution of the differences in characteristics and in coefficients.  
Insert Figure 3 
 Let us first focus on Mauritius and Morocco, two countries where gender differences 
are large. While the gender wage gap remains fairly flat in the former country, it is strongly 
increasing in absolute value in the latter. In Mauritius, the role of differences in characteristics 
is higher in the upper part of the distribution (above the 90
th
 percentile), while differences of 
returns to these characteristics matter more in its lower part. For instance, differences in 
coefficients are about four times higher than differences in characteristics till the median 
earnings. An opposite pattern holds in Morocco. The role of labor market returns is increasing 
along the distribution and the weight of differences in coefficients exceeds the weight of 
differences in characteristics above the 40
th
 percentile.
 Concerning the other countries, the contribution of differences in coefficients when 
explaining earnings inequality between men and women strongly varies across the wage 
distribution. In Benin and Senegal, women would receive higher wages than men if they were 
paid on the same basis for their individual characteristics. In Kenya, the gender wage gap is 
essentially due to the fact that men and women working in the manufacturing sectors have 
                                                
22 We have also estimated fixed effects quantile regressions following Koenker (2005). As in the linear 
regression, the gender quantile coefficients are much lower with the fixed effects specifications in Mauritius and 
in Morocco. 
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different individual characteristics since the curves of total difference and difference in 
endowments are almost merged, especially above the median. Conversely, in Madagascar and 
Uganda, the gender wage gap essentially stems from differences in returns to the disadvantage 
of women. 
  
 3.5. The role of the firm characteristics 
From our previous discussions, it is clear that wage policies settled by firms are likely 
to influence gender earnings differentials. An interesting question is to know whether the 
firms’ characteristics tend to increase or reduce the gender earnings gap. For that purpose, we 
extend the previous Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition following Meng (2004) to account for the 
role of the firm fixed effects (see Appendix). The total earnings differential is given by the 
sum of three terms: one related to differences in individual characteristics, one related to 
differences in the returns to these characteristics, and one related to difference in the firm’s 
premium paid to male and female employees. When this last term is negative, this means that 
the firm tends to narrow the gender wage gap. Then, the gap would have been higher without 
the role of the firm’s wage policy. 
 As pointed out in Meng (2004), the above decomposition does not account for the 
possibility of gender segregation across firms. To control for the role of gender segregation, 
we proceed in the following way. In a first step, we estimate gender-specific wage equations 
including both individual and firm explanatory variables, and we add in the list of covariates 
the proportion of female employees measured at the firm level. This allows us to pick up the 
effect of the gender employment ratio on earnings. In a second step, using these estimates, we 
compute for each employee the predicted value of earnings, which is now net of gender 
segregation across firms
23
. The fixed effects decomposition is finally performed using the 
adjusted wage as dependent variable.  
 As we estimated gender-specific fixed effect regressions, this implies that the sample 
is now restricted to firms with at least two male and two female employees. This significantly 
reduces the size of the selected samples, especially in countries like Benin, Kenya, Senegal or 
Uganda, where the proportion of female employees is somewhat low in the formal 
manufacturing sectors. As a consequence, we note that the total difference in earnings 
between men and women is substantially higher with the new sample selection in Kenya and 
Uganda for instance. 
                                                
23 In our empirical analysis, we do not account for the possibility that the effect of gender segregation across 
firms depends on the type of occupation within the firms.  
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 As shown in Table 6 and Figure 3, the main conclusion from the decomposition of the 
fixed effects model is that firms do not really influence the magnitude of the gender earnings 
gap in the African labor markets, except in Senegal. In Benin, the positive sign for the 
component of the firm effects indicates that the firm wage policies are associated with a rise 
in the gender earnings gap, but the corresponding impact remains very limited (1.5%). An 
opposite pattern is found in Kenya, with a decrease of 0.9% of the gender gap, while the 
variation is even smaller in Madagascar, in Mauritius, in Morocco and in Uganda. The 
negative coefficient is larger in Senegal, indicating that firms pay a higher wage premium to 
their female employees than they do to their male employees
24
. On the whole, our findings 
thus suggest that African manufacturing firms do not really attempt to narrow gender 
differences in pay.  
Insert Table 6 here 
Insert Figure 3 here 
4. Conclusion  
This study makes use of matched employer-employee data collected in seven African 
countries (Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal and Uganda) to shed 
light on the magnitude of the gender wage gap in the manufacturing sector. With such data, it 
is possible to account for the effect of the firm’s wage policy on gender earnings differentials. 
This is crucial if firms tend to pay men and women differently. Taking into account the 
employer’s effect on wages is also a way to reduce the bias in the gender wage gap estimates 
that may often be present due to the existence of workers’ sorting across firms offering 
different wages. Such analysis would not be feasible with the use of household surveys where 
there is generally no information on the respondent’s employer.  
The various empirical analyses conducted in this paper lead to the following 
conclusions. First, preliminary statistics justify taking a distributional approach to have a 
proper view of the magnitude of the gender wage gaps in Africa. Indeed, raw gender gaps 
calculated at the mean of the samples hide significant differences in the magnitude of the gaps 
along the wage distribution. This is particularly true for the cases of Benin, Morocco and 
Uganda, where the raw gaps vary significantly depending on the workers’ relative position in 
the wage distribution. In Benin for instance, the raw gap is significantly in favor of men in the 
lower part of the wage distribution, while it is in favor of women in its upper part. By 
                                                
24 However, this result has to be interpreted with cautious given the limited size of the Senegalese sample once 
the latter is restricted to firms comprising at least two male and two female employees. 
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contrast, the reverse holds true for Uganda where the gap reverses sign and is detrimental to 
women in the upper part of the distribution. In Morocco, the significant gap increases steadily 
all along the wage distribution, thereby revealing the potential existence of a glass ceiling 
effect against women on top of the distribution (Nordman and Wolff, 2009a). 
Secondly, we estimate wage regressions controlling for workers’ human capital and 
job characteristics and for heterogeneity at the firm level. This investigation suggests that we 
have to make a difference between two groups of countries. The first one comprises Benin, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and Uganda where there is no significant evidence of difference 
in male and female earnings once worker, job and firm characteristics are accounted for. The 
second group includes Mauritius and Morocco, where earnings are found to be statistically 
different between men and women.  
We then believe that differences among the seven African countries could be due to 
the presence of selectivity effects, through gender differences in access to jobs. Indeed, as 
there are few women working in the formal manufacturing sectors in Benin, Kenya, Senegal, 
and Uganda, these women are likely to have unobserved characteristics positively correlated 
with their productivity. This is expected to strongly reduce differences in earnings between 
men and women. Unfortunately, there is not much we can do to correct selectivity effects with 
such datasets, which is a shortcoming of the present study. 
We further perform a regression-based decomposition whose aim it to decompose the 
explained portion of the individual wage differentials into weights for each of the considered 
covariates (including gender, workers’ human capital and firm effects). Both in Benin, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Senegal and Uganda, the gender dummy explains at most 0.5% of the overall 
wage difference, while the weight of gender is much more important in Morocco (5.6%) and 
even three times higher in Mauritius (18.6%). So, among the selected African manufacturing 
sectors, the question of gender inequality in earnings is essentially a concern in Mauritius. By 
contrast, the contribution of education in this decomposition is much more important since it 
exceeds 50% in the seven African countries. The weight of firm heterogeneity in earnings 
differentials is also important, with contributions of about 20% in Madagascar and Morocco 
and even 30% in Benin and Uganda.  
An additional step in our analysis is to investigate the pattern of the adjusted gender 
wage gaps along the wage distribution using quantile regressions. Indeed, not observing an 
adjusted gender gap using regressions at the means (OLS regressions) does not necessarily 
signify that there is no unfair earnings treatment in the investigated manufacturing firms. We 
find that the adjusted gender gap does not really vary across the wage distribution in 
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Mauritius. By contrast, the adjusted gender gap is almost three times higher at the ninth decile 
than at the first decile in Morocco. The quantile estimates for the other countries show that the 
shape of the adjusted gender gap is country-specific. For instance, in Benin, unexplained 
differences in earnings between men and women hold only in the lower part of the wage 
distribution, while the opposite pattern is found in Uganda. Besides, there is no clear variation 
across the distribution in Kenya, Madagascar and Senegal. 
We then perform earnings decompositions at quantiles, which separate the total 
difference in earnings between men and women into two components: one due to differences 
in individuals’ labor market characteristics and one due to differences in the returns to these 
characteristics. In Mauritius, the role of differences in characteristics is higher in the upper 
part of the distribution, while differences of returns to these characteristics matter more in its 
lower part. An opposite pattern holds in Morocco where the role of labor market returns is 
increasing along the distribution and the weight of differences in coefficients exceeds the 
weight of differences in characteristics above the fourth decile. Results are mixed for the other 
countries where we find that the contribution of differences in returns when explaining 
earnings inequality between men and women strongly varies along the wage distribution. For 
instance, in Benin and Senegal, female employees would receive higher wages than their male 
counterparts if they were paid on the same basis for their individual characteristics. 
An interesting question is to know whether the firms’ characteristics tend to increase 
or reduce the gender earnings gap. We then add a third term to the preceding decompositions, 
i.e. the difference in the firm’s premium paid to male and female employees. A negative third 
term would indicate that the firm tends to narrow the gender wage gap. In addition, we 
account for the possible firm sorting by adjusting wages using the proportion of female 
employees in each firm. This is a way to correct for the potential bias in the gender wage gap 
estimates due to the sorting of males and females across firms offering different wages. The 
main conclusion from these last decompositions is that firms do not really influence the 
magnitude of the gender earnings gap in the African labor markets, except in Senegal. This 
suggests that African manufacturing firms do not really attempt to narrow gender wage 
inequalities. 
This last result is in contrast to other findings in developed countries where the impact 
of the firm effects on the magnitude of the gender wage gap appears more substantial. In 
Australia and France for instance, Meng (2004) and Meng and Meurs (2004) show that firm 
wage policies are associated with a significant narrowing of the gender earnings gaps, 
especially in the former country. Nevertheless, it is not possible to provide comparison points 
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with other developing countries as, to the best of our knowledge, this study of the gender 
wage gaps with matched data on African countries is the first of its kind. Nevertheless, it is 
likely that the nature of the data used in this study, i.e. collected in relatively homogenous 
manufacturing sectors while those used in developed countries usually include service 
industries (Meng and Meurs, 2004), hides the possible existence of more influential firm 
wage strategies in Africa, in particular in large-sized firms.  
A few caveats have to be kept in mind when interpreting our results. A first remark is 
the highly specific nature of our samples, with a focus on the manufacturing sectors only. It 
would then be worthwhile to expand the availability of matched data for further studies in 
other formal sectors, not only in the countries under consideration in our study, but also in 
other African countries. A second shorthcoming is our impossibility to further examine the 
selection effect resulting from unequal access to job opportunities amongst men and women. 
As shown in our empirical analysis, the very low proportion of women employed in some 
countries suggests that access to jobs in the manufacturing sector may be very selective.  
It would then be of interest to better understand why countries such as Mauritius and 
Morocco have such higher women hirings than the other countries in the study. This could be 
due to a different sectoral composition of the economy, but this may also stem from a 
different functioning of the labor markets. Clearly, more information is needed to understand 
the factors behind access to jobs, especially amongst women. A complementary analysis 
based on cross-sectional data, with information on both working and non-working people, 
would allow us to understand the factors explaining the probability for a woman to have a job 
and to estimate selectivity-corrected wage regressions. The drawback with such household 
data is the lack of firm characteristics for those who have a job, which is certainly harmful as 
our analysis has highlighted the necessity to account for the firms’ characteristics (either 
observed or unobserved).  
While understanding the driving forces behind hirings is a task left for future research, 
institutional and economic policies that might be pursued to encourage equal hiring in 
different countries with different industrial profiles are more than welcome to reduce the 
magnitude of earnings differences between men and women. Further reduction of the gender 
gap should entail policies aimed at promoting women’s access to quality jobs in high paying 
firms in the formal sector, as well as policies intended to foster equal pay for equal jobs. As it 
stands, our empirical analysis sheds light on the necessity to further examine the gender wage 
gap in all African countries and to assess the role of gender-specific access to job on this gap. 
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For that purpose, additional quantitative findings along with qualitative analysis would be 
helpful to further explain specificities between the various African countries. 
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Table 4. Decomposition à la Fields of the log hourly wages 
Country Explanatory variables Total 
Gender Marital 
status 
Years of 
schooling 
Years of 
experience 
Years of 
tenure 
Occupation Firm effects 
Benin         
(1A) Basic 0.09% 4.66% 83.78% 2.40% 9.07% - - 100.00% 
(1B) Basic + occupations 0.05% 4.15% 64.09% 2.26% 7.25% 22.19% - 100.00% 
(1C) Basic + occ. + fixed effects 0.00% 3.77% 39.92% 2.22% 4.65% 16.52% 32.92% 100.00% 
Kenya         
(2A) Basic 0.04% n.a. 65.25% 18.46% 16.25% - - 100.00% 
(2B) Basic + occupations 0.22% n.a. 17.35% 6.25% 6.94% 69.24% - 100.00% 
(2C) Basic + occ. + fixed effects 0.14% n.a. 15.89% 6.04% 5.92% 55.94% 16.08% 100.00% 
Madagascar         
(3A) Basic 0.52% 2.32% 83.98% 1.33% 11.85% - - 100.00% 
(3B) Basic + occupations 0.59% 1.93% 31.50% 0.62% 6.06% 59.30% - 100.00% 
(3C) Basic + occ. + fixed effects 0.56% 1.30% 20.58% 0.41% 4.70% 48.78% 23.68% 100.00% 
Mauritius         
(4A) Basic 18.52% 1.71% 51.84% 3.40% 24.52% - - 100.00% 
(4B) Basic + occupations 17.46% 1.18% 23.63% 2.13% 17.97% 37.64% - 100.00% 
(4C) Basic + occ. + fixed effects 15.75% 1.08% 20.85% 1.81% 15.49% 33.62% 11.40% 100.00% 
Morocco         
(5A) Basic 5.56% 6.17% 72.42% 3.47% 12.37% - - 100.00% 
(5B) Basic + occupations 2.88% 2.91% 28.42% 1.63% 8.08% 56.07% - 100.00% 
(5C) Basic + occ. + fixed effects 2.33% 2.31% 17.84% 1.29% 5.44% 48.86% 21.91% 100.00% 
Senegal         
(6A) Basic 0.23% 8.14% 64.70% 6.27% 20.67% - - 100.00% 
(6B) Basic + occupations -0.33% 5.71% 31.95% 3.81% 15.52% 43.34% - 100.00% 
(6C) Basic + occ. + fixed effects -0.06% 5.09% 26.38% 3.84% 10.53% 38.50% 15.72% 100.00% 
Uganda         
(7A) Basic 0.17% n.a. 71.60% 23.12% 5.12% - - 100.00% 
(7B) Basic + occupations 0.18% n.a. 24.51% 9.76% 1.68% 63.87% - 100.00% 
(7C) Basic + occ. + fixed effects -0.08% n.a. 15.33% 3.76% 0.69% 44.72% 35.59% 100.00% 
Source: Investment Climate Surveys for Benin (2004), Kenya (2003), Madagascar (2005), Mauritius (2005), Senegal (2003), Uganda (2003). 
FACS for Morocco (2000). Authors’ calculations.
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Table 5. Gender estimates from quantile regressions of the log hourly wages 
Country Percentile Mean 
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Benin       
Basic -0.308*** -0.093* -0.012 -0.015 0.049 -0.101 
(4.73) (1.73) (0.21) (0.24) (0.44) (0.97) 
Basic + Occupations -0.196** -0.139*** -0.085 0.014 0.129 -0.085 
(2.32) (2.86) (1.38) (0.18) (1.27) (0.82) 
Basic + occupation + fixed effects 0.001 -0.001 -0.032 -0.031 -0.052 -0.036 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.52) (0.61) (0.89) (0.72) 
Kenya       
Basic -0.005 -0.030 0.019 -0.020 -0.041 -0.010 
(0.09) (0.85) (0.35) (0.25) (0.37) (0.18) 
Basic + Occupations -0.086* -0.068 -0.063 -0.080 -0.221* -0.064 
(1.70) (1.48) (1.28) (1.21) (1.86) (1.29) 
Basic + occupation + fixed effects -0.000 -0.028 -0.080* -0.075 -0.022 -0.036 
(0.01) (0.88) (1.77) (1.45) (0.40) (0.87) 
Madagascar       
Basic -0.048 -0.036 -0.004 -0.061 0.014 -0.056 
(1.51) (0.93) (0.10) (1.20) (0.16) (1.29) 
Basic + Occupations -0.049 -0.080*** -0.054 -0.124*** -0.130 -0.098** 
(1.19) (2.58) (1.44) (2.68) (1.59) (2.19) 
Basic + occupation + fixed effects -0.043 -0.039 -0.036 -0.038 -0.046 -0.047 
(1.49) (1.56) (1.57) (1.17) (1.29) (1.33) 
Mauritius       
Basic -0.320*** -0.359*** -0.346*** -0.368*** -0.381*** -0.353*** 
(5.90) (8.22) (8.18) (7.73) (5.64) (7.98) 
Basic + Occupations -0.342*** -0.365*** -0.406*** -0.430*** -0.478*** -0.397*** 
(4.98) (9.09) (9.78) (10.20) (7.12) (9.26) 
Basic + occupation + fixed effects -0.195*** -0.253*** -0.237*** -0.235*** -0.275*** -0.223*** 
(5.18) (9.40) (8.12) (7.95) (7.58) (6.25) 
Morocco       
Basic -0.061*** -0.069*** -0.095*** -0.137*** -0.168*** -0.124*** 
(4.89) (7.22) (8.65) (10.07) (7.33) (8.27) 
Basic + Occupations -0.053*** -0.057*** -0.066*** -0.102*** -0.135*** -0.086*** 
(3.78) (7.10) (7.26) (8.27) (7.54) (6.20) 
Basic + occupation + fixed effects -0.022** -0.036*** -0.044*** -0.067*** -0.091*** -0.075*** 
(1.99) (28.62) (17.59) (6.83) (79.57) (6.32) 
Senegal       
Basic 0.113 0.014 0.025 0.037 0.026 0.037 
(1.14) (0.25) (0.53) (0.51) (0.25) (0.69) 
Basic + Occupations 0.066 -0.035 -0.060 -0.058 -0.118 -0.063 
(0.52) (0.52) (1.02) (0.80) (1.22) (1.00) 
Basic + occupation + fixed effects 0.057 -0.001 -0.074 -0.085* -0.082 -0.042 
(1.24) (0.03) (1.62) (1.95) (1.25) (0.81) 
Uganda       
Basic 0.224* 0.243*** 0.050 -0.157 -0.360** 0.075 
(1.76) (2.61) (0.53) (1.26) (2.41) (0.84) 
Basic + Occupations 0.279** 0.113 0.055 -0.073 -0.191 0.109 
(2.52) (1.15) (0.73) (0.57) (1.20) (1.27) 
Basic + occupation + fixed effects 0.088 0.038 -0.015 -0.145 -0.322* -0.067 
(0.61) (0.43) (0.17) (0.98) (1.79) (0.78) 
Source: Investment Climate Surveys for Benin (2004), Kenya (2003), Madagascar (2005), Mauritius (2005), Senegal (2003), Uganda (2003),  
FACS for Morocco (2000). Authors’ calculations. 
Significance levels are respectively equal to 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
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Table 6. Decomposition of the gender earnings differentials accounting for gender segregation across firms 
Country Benin Kenya Madagascar Mauritius Morocco Senegal Uganda 
Difference in characteristics Value 0.1002 0.1172 0.0271 0.1629 0.1254 -0.0011 0.2516 
   % 122.0% 55.0% 42.3% 38.7% 47.6% -9.5% 53.2% 
Difference in coefficients Value -0.0193 0.0979 0.0369 0.2574 0.1384 0.0148 0.2208 
   % -23.5% 45.9% 57.4% 61.2% 52.6% 130.0% 46.7% 
Difference in firm effects Value 0.0012 -0.0018 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0023 0.0002 
   % 1.5% -0.9% 0.3% 0.0% -0.2% -20.5% 0.1% 
Total difference  Value 0.0821 0.2132 0.0642 0.4203 0.2633 0.0114 0.4727 
   % 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Investment Climate Surveys for Benin (2004), Kenya (2003), Madagascar (2005), Mauritius (2005), Senegal (2003), 
Uganda (2003),  FACS for Morocco (2000). Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 1. Sex compostion of the employee’s samples 
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Source: Investment Climate Surveys for Benin (2004), Kenya (2003), Madagascar (2005), Mauritius (2005), Senegal (2003), 
 Uganda (2003), FACS for Morocco (2000). Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2. Descriptive statistics of the gender wage gap 
A. At the mean of the sample 
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B. Across the wage distribution 
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Source: Investment Climate Surveys for Benin (2004), Kenya (2003), Madagascar (2005), Mauritius (2005), Senegal (2003), 
 Uganda (2003), FACS for Morocco (2000). Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3. Quantile decompositions of the gender wage gap, by countries 
A. Benin 
B. Kenya 
C. Madagascar 
D. Mauritius 
E. Morocco 
F. Senegal 
G. Uganda 
Source: Investment Climate Surveys for Benin (2004), Kenya (2003), Madagascar (2005), Mauritius (2005), Senegal (2003), Uganda 
(2003), FACS for Morocco (2000). Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 4. Decomposition of the gender earnings differentials accounting for gender segregation across firms
Source: Investment Climate Surveys for Benin (2004), Kenya (2003), Madagascar (2005), Mauritius (2005), Senegal (2003), 
Uganda (2003), FACS for Morocco (2000). Authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix 
• Regression analysis 
 To account for gender differences at the mean wage level, we turn to OLS regressions. 
We control for several individual characteristics (like age, education, etc) and include in the list 
of controls a gender dummy variable, so that the model we estimate is (with i  and j  as 
subscripts respectively for the employee and the firm): 
jijijiji FXw εγβ ++=ln        (1) 
with jiwln  the log hourly wage, jiX  the set of covariates, jiF  the gender dummy, β  and γ
parameters to be estimated, and jiε  a residual supposed to be normally distributed. Since we 
have completed questionnaires for several employees per firm, we calculate robust standard 
errors (using a clustering procedure) since the different workers within a firm will certainly have 
correlated characteristics. By accounting for both male and female workers when estimating (1), 
the underlying assumption is that the returns to the different explanatory variables are not 
gender-specific. 
Since we have repeated information for several employees per firm, we can control for 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level using fixed effects models. Again, we 
rely on a linear specification of the form:  
jijjijiji FXw εδγβ +++=ln        (2) 
where jδ  is a firm fixed effect. The model is estimated by adding a set of firm dummy variables 
in the OLS regressions. The firms’ heterogeneity components jδ  is supposed to be correlated 
with the covariates jiX . Since the workplace is the same for all the workers belonging to a given 
firm, all the firm characteristics are picked up by the fixed effect. 
• Field’s decomposition 
The decomposition suggested by Fields (2004) may be implemented in the following 
way. Omitting the different subscripts for simplicity, we consider the linear regression 
εγβ ++= FXwln  and assume that there are K  exogenous regressors in X  indexed by k  (with 
Kk ,...,1= ). Then, the variance of the dependent variable wln  can be expressed as: 
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)ln,cov()ln,cov()ln,cov()var(ln wwFwXw
k kk
εγβ ++=

.   (3) 
Let us define )var(ln/)ln,cov()( wwXXs kkk β= , )var(ln/)ln,cov()( wwFFs γ=  and 
)var(ln/)ln,cov()( wws εε = . It follows that (Fields, 2004): 
%100)()()( =++

εsFsXs
k k
       (4) 
which indicates the relative contribution of the various covariates and the residual. The first two 
terms on the left-hand side of (4) sum exactly to the R-squared, so that )(Fs  and )( kXs  provide 
respectively the weight of gender and the weight of each regressor k . 
• Quantile regressions 
 Quantile wage regressions consider specific parts of the conditional distribution of the 
hourly wage and indicate the influence of the different explanatory variables on wages 
respectively at the bottom, at the median and at the top of the log hourly wage distribution. Using 
our previous notation, the model that we seek to estimate is: 
jijiji FXwq )()()(ln θγθβθ +=        (5) 
where )(ln jiwqθ  is the θ th conditional quantile of the log hourly wage. The set of coefficients 
θβ  provides the estimated rates of return to the different covariates (gender being excluded) at 
the θ th quantile of the log wage distribution and the coefficient θγ  measures the part of the 
wage gap that is due to gender differences. In a quantile regression, the distribution of the error 
term is left unspecified. The quantile regression method provides robust estimates, particularly 
for misspecification errors related to non-normality and heteroskedasticity. 
• Mean and quantile decompositions   
 For the presentation, let Hwln  and Fwln  be the log hourly wage of men and women 
respectively. From separate regressions HHHH Xw εβ +=ln  and FFFF Xw εβ +=ln  performed 
on the male and female subsamples, we deduce that the gender wage gap is  
FHFFHHFH XXww εεββ −+−=− lnln . This gap can be decomposed in the following way 
(Oaxaca and Ramson, 1994): 
)()()(lnln FHFFHFHHFH XXXww εεβββ −+−+−=−    (6) 
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 In (6), the first term on the right-hand side )( FHH XX −β  is the explained part of the 
gender wage gap, which is due to differences in individual characteristics between men and 
women (endowment effects). The second term FFH X)( ββ −  is due to the difference in the price 
that the market pays to male and female workers for their personal characteristics.  
 As shown in Machado and Mata (2005), this decomposition may be implemented at the 
various quantiles of the earnings distribution. The distribution of earnings conditional on 
individual characteristics is first estimated using linear quantile regressions, then the conditional 
distribution is approximated by estimating a large number of quantile regressions and the 
conditional distribution of earnings is finally integrated over the covariates to obtain the 
unconditional distribution. 
 Finally, a similar decomposition may be done in presence of fixed effects. Using the 
same notation, we first estimate fixed effects regressions, respectively for the subsamples of men 
and women. From HHHHH Xw εδβ ++=ln  and FFFFF Xw εδβ ++=ln  and recalling that 
Hδ  and Fδ  are firm fixed effects, it follows that: 
)()()()(lnln FHFHFFHFHHFH XXXww εεδδβββ −+−+−+−=−   (7) 
 According to (7), the total earnings differential may be expressed as a sum of three terms. 
The first one )( FHH XX −β  is related to differences in personal characteristics between men 
and women. The second one FFH X)( ββ −  is due to differences in the returns to these 
individual characteristics. Finally, the term )( FH δδ −  is the difference in the firm’s premium 
which is paid to male and female employees. 
